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5 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
6 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

7 GERARDO CASTILLO,
8

9 *Petitioner,*

3:13-cv-00704-LRH-VPC

10 vs.

11 ORDER

12 LEGRAND, *et al.*,

13 *Respondents.*

14 This habeas matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 comes before the Court on its *sua sponte* inquiry into
15 whether the petition should be dismissed without prejudice as wholly unexhausted. This order follows
16 upon a prior show-cause order (#7), a subsequent order (#13) addressing petitioner's preliminary
17 invocation of procedural default to constructively exhaust his claims, and petitioner's show-cause
18 response (#14).

19 ***Background***

20 Petitioner Gerardo Castillo challenges his 2005 Nevada state conviction, pursuant to a jury
21 verdict, of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. He challenged the conviction on direct
22 appeal and on state post-conviction review. In his show-cause response, petitioner does not contend
23 that any of his claims are actually exhausted rather than constructively exhausted by procedural default.
24 The particularized analysis outlining why none of the claims are actually exhausted is detailed in the
25 show-cause order. See #7, at 2-3.

26 ***Governing Law***

27 The Court may raise issues of exhaustion *sua sponte*. See, e.g., *Aiken v. Spalding*, 841 F.2d 881,
28 883 (9th Cir. 1988). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), a habeas petitioner first must exhaust his state

1 court remedies on a claim before presenting that claim to the federal courts. To satisfy this exhaustion
 2 requirement, the claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts completely through to the
 3 highest court available, in this case the Supreme Court of Nevada. *E.g., Peterson v. Lampert*, 319 F.3d
 4 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)(*en banc*); *Vang v. Nevada*, 329 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003). In the state
 5 courts, the petitioner must refer to the specific federal constitutional guarantee and must also state the
 6 facts that entitle the petitioner to relief on the federal constitutional claim. *E.g., Shumway v. Payne*, 223
 7 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). That is, fair presentation requires that the petitioner present the state
 8 courts with both the operative facts and the federal legal theory upon which his claim is based. *E.g.,*
 9 *Castillo v. McFadden*, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). The exhaustion requirement insures that the
 10 state courts, as a matter of federal-state comity, will have the first opportunity to pass upon and correct
 11 alleged violations of federal constitutional guarantees. *See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722,
 12 731(1991).

13 A petition that is completely unexhausted is subject to immediate dismissal. *See, e.g., Rasberry*
 14 *v. Garcia*, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); *Jiminez v. Rice*, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir.2001).

15 ***Discussion***

16 Petitioner contends first that exhaustion would be futile because the state courts would reject
 17 his claims on procedural grounds.

18 When petitioner referenced this argument prior to his show-cause response, the Court stated the
 19 law that it applies in considering such an argument:

20 A petitioner potentially can establish that a claim is
 21 constructively exhausted because it is procedurally defaulted. To date,
 22 however, the state courts have not applied any procedural bars to any of
 23 petitioner's claims in the federal petition, given that petitioner has not
 24 fairly presented any of the claims to the state courts through to the state
 25 supreme court. Significantly, the Nevada state courts apply substantially
 26 the same standards as do the federal courts in determining whether a
 27 petitioner can overcome a possible procedural default of a claim.[FN1]
 28 The Court therefore will not find a claim constructively exhausted based
 upon the claim being procedurally defaulted unless the petitioner
 unequivocally stipulates that the unexhausted claims in fact would be
 denied on state procedural grounds if he returned to state court to present
 the claims. Such an unequivocal stipulation, to in truth be unequivocal
 in light of the procedural default rules under Nevada law, must include
 concessions that: (1) petitioner cannot avoid dismissal of the claims in
 the state courts because he cannot demonstrate cause and prejudice in the
 state courts to overcome the state procedural bars; (2) petitioner cannot

1 avoid dismissal of the claims in the state courts because he cannot
 2 demonstrate in the state courts that the alleged constitutional violation
 3 probably has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent
 4 and cannot thereby overcome these procedural bars; and (3) the
 5 procedural bars otherwise are now consistently applied by the Nevada
 6 state courts, such that it is not possible that the state courts, as a
 7 discretionary matter, would consider the claims despite the procedural
 8 default and despite a failure to demonstrate either cause and prejudice or
 9 actual innocence. Absent such unequivocal concessions, the Court will
 10 not hold that there is no possibility that the unexhausted claims would be
 11 considered by the state courts on the merits.

12 [FN1] Under state practice, "[a] petitioner can overcome
 13 the bar to an untimely or successive petition by showing
 14 good cause and prejudice." *E.g., Mitchell v. State*, 149
 15 P.3d 33, 36 (Nev. 2006). In *Robinson v. Ignacio*, 360
 16 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2004), the court of appeals
 17 recognized that "Nevada's 'cause and prejudice' analysis
 18 and the federal 'cause and prejudice analysis' are nearly
 19 identical, as both require 'cause for the default and actual
 20 prejudice as a result.'" 360 F.3d at 1052 n.3. Moreover,
 21 the Nevada state courts also recognize the same
 22 exception for a fundamental miscarriage of justice, such
 23 that "[e]ven when a petitioner cannot show good cause
 24 sufficient to overcome the bars to an untimely or
 successive petition, habeas relief may still be granted if
 the petitioner can demonstrate that 'a constitutional
 violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
 who is actually innocent.'" *Mitchell*, 149 P.3d at 36
 (quoting *Murray v. Carrier*, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)).

25 In short, if petitioner wishes to rely on procedural default case
 26 law to overcome the lack of exhaustion of his claims, he must
 27 unequivocally stipulate that he cannot overcome any applicable state
 28 procedural bars in the state courts. If he does not so stipulate, the Court
 will dismiss the petition without prejudice for complete lack of
 exhaustion. If he does so stipulate, then the Court instead will dismiss
 the petition with prejudice on the basis of procedural default. Given that
 the Nevada courts apply substantially the same standards to overcome a
 procedural default as in federal court, there is no "middle area" where a
 petitioner can rely upon a possible procedural default to demonstrate the
 constructive exhaustion of his claims and then present a cause-
 and-prejudice or other argument for the first time in federal court to
 overcome the procedural bar. Rather, petitioner must present any such
 cause-and-prejudice or other argument to the state courts in the first
 instance if he seeks to overcome a possible procedural default of his
 claims.

29 #13, at 2-3 (second footnote omitted).

30 In the show-cause response, petitioner states:

31 . . . [U]nder state procedural bars the . . . Nevada Supreme Court
 32 . . . does not recognize attorney errors and/or negligence as cause
 (Mitchell, 149 P.3d 33). Thus as such petitioner asserts that he cannot

1 overcome the imminent state bar under the first example for cause
 2 provided by this Court (Dkt 13 at pg. 2 Ln 20). However the other
 3 example for cause can be met (Dkt 13 at pg. 2 Fn 1) wherein under . . .
 4 Murray v. Carrier 477 US 478 . . . House v. Bell 547 US 518 . . . the
 grounds in the instant habeas has set forth new evidence that if allowed
 before a jury would have substantiated petitioners [sic] contention for a
 finding of not guilty, due to actual innocence. . . .

5 #14, at 1-2.

6 As explicitly stated in the prior order, the Nevada state courts also recognize actual innocence
 7 as a potential basis for overcoming a procedural default in state court. Petitioner thus cannot
 8 successfully establish that his claims are constructively exhausted on the premise that they would be
 9 procedurally barred in the Nevada state courts while at the same time maintaining that he can overcome
 10 a procedural default of the claims upon a showing of actual innocence. The argument that petitioner
 11 seeks to raise in federal court can be made to the Nevada state courts in the first instance. As the prior
 12 order stated, there is no “middle area” where a petitioner can claim that the Nevada courts would not
 13 hear his claims on the basis of procedural default while at the same time invoking an exception to
 14 procedural default rules that the Nevada courts also clearly recognize.

15 Petitioner therefore has failed to demonstrate that his claims are constructively exhausted on the
 16 basis of futility and procedural default.

17 Petitioner further requests that the Court enter a stay under *Rhines v. Weber*, 544 U.S. 269
 18 (2005). However, a stay is available only where the federal petition is a mixed petition including both
 19 exhausted and unexhausted claims. The federal petition in this action instead is completely
 20 unexhausted. A stay therefore is not available. *Rasberry*, 448 F.3d at 1154; *Jones v. McDaniel*, 2009
 21 WL 890915 (9th Cir. April 2, 2009).

22 IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that this action shall be DISMISSED without prejudice for
 23 complete lack of exhaustion.

24 IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED, as jurists of reason
 25 would not find the dismissal of the completely unexhausted petition without prejudice to be debatable
 26 or wrong.

27 IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
 28 Cases, the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this order and the final judgment by informal electronic

1 service upon Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto, along with regenerated notices of electronic
2 filing of the prior filings herein. **No response is required from respondents in this matter other than**
3 **to respond to the orders of any reviewing court.**

4 The Clerk shall enter final judgment accordingly, dismissing this action without prejudice.

5 DATED this 20th day of June, 2014.

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9 LARRY R. HICKS
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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